
Program design options




• Maximum increases

- "fair or reasonable return"
- "banked" increases
- Limits to exceptions (max increases)
- homes, 2-4 unit
- buildings) Owner-occupation
- Public information
- Fees to support implementation



Program design options



- CPI + pct
- Nominal amount
- Maximum increases

- (full or partial)
- (maintenance, CI, utilities, property taxes)
- "fair or reasonable return"
- "banked" increases
- Limits to exceptions (max increases)

- (rolling or fixed)
- Small buildings (single family homes, 2-4 unit buildings)
- Owner-occupation

- Monitoring
- Dispute resolution
- Public information
- Fees to support implementation



Rent cap impacts

- Over time rent control programs reduce rents paid in controlled units
- "Tenure discounts" significant over time
- Rent caps eliminate "rent gouging"



Rent cap impacts

- Rent caps increase residential stability
 - Tenants stay in units longer
- e.g., San Francisco:
 - Rent control increases stability 20%
 - Large share of those still in their units would have otherwise moved out of SF
 - Stability effects stronger for older households & for longer-term residents
 - Stability effects stronger among BIPOC tenants
- Consistent research finding



RENT CAPS

Four approaches

- Determined by rent board
- Flat percentage increase
- Variable increase
- Variable with upper/ lower limits



Jurisdiction	Rent Increase Cap (current)					
St. Paul, MN	3% flat increase					
Los Angeles, CA	100% of CPI (minimum limit is 3%, maximum limit is 8%)					
Oakland, CA	100% of CPI					
Richmond, CA	100% of CPI					
Sacramento, CA	CPI + 5%					
San Francisco, CA	60% of CPI, maximum 7%					
San Jose, CA	5% flat increase					
Santa Ana, CA	The lesser of 3% or 80% of CPI					
Washington, DC	CPI + 2% (max 10%); Elderly/disabled 100% CPI, max 5%					
Camden, NJ	100% of CPI, maximum 6%					
Hoboken, NJ	100% of CPI					
Jersey City, NJ	The lesser of a) 4% or b) pct. difference between CPI 3 months prior the end and 3 months prior to the beginning of the lease term.					
New Brunswick, NJ	Housing component of CPI (2.8% in 2022)					
Newark, NJ	100% of CPI, maximum increase of 4%					
Trenton, NJ	Housing component of CPI, updated every 6 months					
New York City (RS)	Administered annually through Rent Board. Usually under 2%					
State of California	CPI + 5%					
State of Oregon	CPI + 7%					


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State of Oregon	CPI + 7%					
CUIC Center for & Region						

Rollbacks

- Setting of base rent retroactive to date before beginning of rent control program
 - Typically 6 months to one year
- Addresses time lag between announcement of rent controls and their application
- To head off anticipatory rent increases by property owners



Program design options



increases

- return"
- "banked" increases
- Limits to exceptions (max increases)

• Fees to support implementation

Owner-occupation



Decontrol

- Permanent decontrol
- Full vacancy decontrol
 - Upon vacancy, owner can raise rents without limit

Partial vacancy decontrol

 Upon vacancy, owner can raise rents above the cap, but not unlimited


NYC "luxury decontrol"

Permanent decontrol, ended in 2019



Impact of vacancy decontrol


- Little research done
- Three NJ studies show no different in rents between cities with and without rent control
 - Authors suggest it is vacancy decontrol...
- Berkeley study in 2013:
 - tenants moved in pre-1999: avg rent = \$780
 - Vacancy decontrolled HHs avg. rent = \$1,436





- (a) Unregulated rents
- (b) Regulated rents
- (c) Regulated rents with vacancy decontrol







- (a) Unregulated rents
- (b) Regulated rents
- (c) Regulated rents with vacancy decontrol



Consequences & incentives

- An incentive to evict?
- An incentive for tenant to remain in unit?
- Disincentive for maintenance?
- Incentive to take units out of rental market?




Examples of vacancy decontrol



- Approximately ½ of rent control programs in 1980s had some form of vacancy decontrol
- 2017 Newark: vacancy decontrol up to 20% depending on how much spent to upgrade unit
- 2019 NYC:
 - Eliminates luxury decontrol
 - Eliminates partial vacancy decontrol

Program design options



 Maximum increases

- "fair or reasonable return"
- "banked" increases
- Limits to exceptions (max increases)
- homes, 2-4 unit buildings)
- Owner-occupation
- Public information
- Fees to support implementation



Pass-throughs

- May property owners 'pass-through' extraordinary costs to tenants, allowing rent increases above the cap amount?
 - Allows flexibility to accommodate special circumstances
 - and to allow 'fair and reasonable return' (which courts require)
 - Require a system of petition and adjudication



Pass-throughs

- Most typically for capital improvements, property taxes, utilities
- Policy design questions:
 - What pct of cost can be passed on?
 - How is it amortized?
 - Is there an upper limit?
 - Who makes the determination if it is allowable?



Capital Improvement

- Most common form of pass-through
 - Can provide strong incentive for building improvements
 - Requires working definition of capital improvement (v. normal maintenance)
 - Some cities condition CI pass-through on judgment of good faith maintenance



• NYC:

- MCI: major capital improvements
 - Must be approved by rent board
 - Amortized over 12.5 years, subject to 2% cap overall
- IAI: individual apartment improvements
 - Need not be approved
- San Francisco:
 - owners in buildings with 5 or fewer units can pass through 100% of CI, subject to 5% annual cap
 - Owners of bigger buildings can only pass 50%, subject to 10% annual cap
- DC: up to 20% for building wide improvements, 15% for other



"FAIR AND REASONABLE RETURN"

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
- Required by Courts
- Often in place of specific pass-throughs
- "Fair return" defined in many different ways
 - Hoboken, NJ: 6% above maximum interest rate on local savings account
- Can be made contingent
 - On health and safety compliance
 - Building code compliance
 - Reasonable purchase price

Preferential rents and banking

- Preferential rents:
 - Lower than maximum-allowed rent increase
- Can owners "bank" and recover them later?
 - Do preferential rents become basis for calculating future increases?
 - Limit to the amount 'cashed in' by owners?



Program design options



- Nominal amount
- Maximum increases

- taxes)
 - "fair or reasonable return"
 - "banked" increases
- Limits to exceptions (max increases)
- Small buildings (single family homes, 2-4 unit buildings)
- Owner-occupation
- Dispute resolution
- Public information
- Fees to support implementation



HOUSING STOCK EXEMPTIONS

- By building size
- By owner-occupation
- By date of construction
- By affordability restrictions



By building size

- Small buildings
 - e.g., NYC excludes buildings with 5 or fewer
 - Jersey City exempts 3 or fewer
- Often framed as "mom and pop" or small-time operators
 - DC exempts 4 or fewer AND owned by an individual
- Single family home exemption
 - Growing investor ownership of SFH rentals complicates the picture

By owner occupation

- Owner occupation in 2 to 4-unit buildings
- Owner or family member occupation
- Controversial and contested



By date of construction

- New construction exemption, justified by
 - fear of dampening rate of housing construction
 - expectation that new buildings rarely provide housing for low-mod renters
- Exemption tied to a fixed date or to a fixed number of years



New construction exemptions

- Tied to a specific date
 - Oakland, 1983
 - NYC, 1974
 - LA, 1978
 - Washington, DC, 1975
- or rolling
 - Newark, NJ, length of initial mortgage or 30 years, whichever is less
 - New Brunswick, NJ, same as Newark
 - Takoma Park, MD 5 years (& only upon petition)
 - State of Oregon 15 years




Other

- Buildings with affordability requirements
 - LA: units with "government imposed regulatory agreement..." guaranteeing affordability
 - Rents are already regulated
- Luxury exemptions
 - MA exempted up to 25% of units at the high end of the market
 - NJ cities have / had luxury exemptions defined by rent amount
 - NYC eliminated its luxury exemption in 2019



Program design options



• Maximum increases

- "fair or reasonable return"
- "banked" increases
- Limits to exceptions (max increases)
- homes, 2-4 unit
- buildings) Owner-occupation
- Public information
- Fees to support implementation



Rent Boards

- Hear & decided petitions
- Hear & resolve disputes
- Set/enforce rent caps
- Oversee registration of regulated units
- Report annually to Council/Mayor
- Develop/manage public information materials



Example rent boards

City	Members	Tenants	Landlords	Homeowners	Other	
Los Angeles	7	0	0		7	
Oakland	9	2	2	5		
San Francisco	5	2	2		1	
Newark	5	2	2	1		
Camden	7	2	2	2	1	
New Brunswick	5	1	1	1		
New York	9	2	2		5	



Registration of units

- Specific, effective, reasonable penalties
- Encourage / increase compliance

Most laws require initial registration

- Record of unit attributes
- Base rent
- Services provided



- Registration of units
- Specific, effective, reasonable penalties

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• Encourage / increase compliance

Penalties for unlawful increases

- Right of action for injunctive relief and damages
- Powers given to City Attorney and/or rent board.
 - In SF, tenant rights organizations, too

- Registration of units
- Specific, effective, reasonable penalties
- Encourage / increase compliance





- Registration of units
- Specific, effective, reasonable penalties
- Encourage / increase compliance

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Oakland workshops, 2021

- Tenant rights workshop
- Small property owner workshop
- Security deposits (property owner focused)
- Tenant rights workshop in Spanish

(workshops scheduled monthly)

- Registration of units
- Specific, effective, reasonable penalties
- Encourage / increase compliance



Oakland

<u>https://www.oaklandca.gov/topics/rent-adjustmen</u> <u>t-program#resources</u>

New Brunswick, NJ

https://www.cityofnewbrunswick.org/residents/de partments/planning_development/rent_control/in dex.php

Santa Monica, CA

https://www.santamonica.gov/departments/rent-con trol#RelatedResourceBagPart

Costs

- 1984 study estimated cost of administering laws ranged \$2 to \$72 per unit per year
 - \$5 to \$195 in 2002 dollars
- Costs highest in first few years
- Sources:
 - General funds
 - Annual registration fees
 - Petition, hearing fees

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Complementary policies?

- e.g., conversion limits
- Eviction and tenant protections:
 - Just cause
 - Harassment prevention
 - Relocation assistance
 - Limiting fees

